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ORIGINALISM—THE FORGOTTEN YEARS 
Frank B. Cross* 
Originalism became best known as a Reagan era conserva-
tive reaction to the Warren Court era and the desire to restrain 
what was perceived as judicial activism. Pam Karlan notes that 
“[o]riginalism as a primary theory of constitutional interpreta-
tion had its origin in the conservative attack on various Warren 
Court decisions.”1 James Fleming declared that originalism was 
“a conservative ideology that emerged in reaction against the 
Warren Court” and “did not exist” prior to that time.2 The 
Warren Court was “accused of ignoring the original meaning of 
the Constitution.”3 The Court was charged with “abandonment 
of originalism.”4 
Few disagree with this story. For the most part liberal critics 
are happy to accept the thesis and approve of the Warren 
Court’s “living Constitution.” Jack Balkin’s efforts to defend a 
liberal originalism have generally not sought to claim that the 
Warren Court was engaged in authentic originalism. Yet this 
widespread acceptance of the nature of the Warren Court’s 
jurisprudence has not been closely examined. In this article, I 
explore originalism in the Warren Court and its meaning. 
 
 * Herbert D. Kelleher Centennial Professor of Business Law, University of Texas 
School of Law. 
 1. Pamela S. Karlan, Constitutional Law as Trademark, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
385, 396 (2009); see also Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 
88 (2009) (suggesting that contemporary originalism was “birthed” by “critics of the 
Warren Court”); Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
599, 599–601 (2004) (describing the development as a reaction to the Warren Court); 
David S. Law & David McGowan, There is Nothing Pragmatic About Originalism, 102 
NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 86, 100 (2007), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/ 
Colloquy/2007/27 (discussing the jurisprudence of the Warren and Burger Courts as “a 
low point for originalism”);. 
 2. James E. Fleming, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1335, 1347 (1997). 
 3. Peter J. Smith, Sources of Federalism: An Empirical Analysis of the Court’s 
Quest for Original Meaning, 52 UCLA L. REV. 217, 233 (2004). 
 4. Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1, 16 (2009).  
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I. THE PRACTICE OF ORIGINALISM IN THE WARREN 
COURT 
Authentic reliance on originalism can be difficult to 
measure. Legal commentators have critiqued Supreme Court 
opinions as non-originalist, but such commentators are not a 
definitive resource for accurate resolution, and they may be 
influenced by their own ideological biases. There is, however, a 
readily available test for whether the Justices are using 
originalism—the legal materials upon which their opinions rely. I 
examine the use of originalist sources during the Warren Court. 
The potentially relevant originalist sources are myriad, but 
some stand out as especially important. The Federalist has been 
called “the most important of originalist sources.”5 This is 
certainly true for the Supreme Court, which has cited to this 
resource more than twice as often as any other originalist source, 
from 1955 to 1984.6 James Madison suggested that The Federalist 
was “the most authentic exposition of the text of the federal 
Constitution, as understood by the Body which prepared & the 
Authority which accepted it.”7 Edwin Meese, the primary author 
of originalism in response to the Warren Court, declared that it 
was The Federalist “which explained the Founders’ intent.”8 
A second important originalist resource is Elliot’s Debates, 
a record of the ratifying discussion for the Constitution.9 Con-
temporary understanding of originalism gives central importance 
to the ratification of the Constitution and the understanding of 
the ratifiers. Today’s originalism focuses on original meaning, 
rather than any subjective intent. The ratifiers are commonly 
regarded as the best resource on such original meaning.10 Until 
 
 5. Pamela C. Corley, Robert M. Howard, & David C. Nixon, The Supreme Court 
and Opinion Content: The Use of the Federalist Papers, 58 POL. RES. Q. 329, 329 (2005). 
 6. Id. at 330. 
 7. Letter to Thomas Jefferson from James Madison (Feb. 8, 1825), in 9 THE 
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 219 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910). 
 8. Edwin Meese III, Challenges Facing Our System of Justice, 3 AVE. MARIA L. 
REV. 303, 307–08 (2005). 
 9. JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES, RESOLUTIONS, AND OTHER PROCEEDINGS 
IN CONVENTION, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (1827). 
 10. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power 
To Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 551 (1994) (suggesting that originalists find 
original meaning in “the text of the Constitution, as originally understood by the people 
who ratified it”); Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Records of the State 
Ratifying Conventions as a Source of the Original Meaning of the U.S. Constitution, 2009 
U. ILL. L. REV. 457, 461 (2009) (identifying one form of original meaning as “what the 
persons who participated in the state ratifying conventions thought that the Constitution 
meant”); Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1127, 1136 (1998) (declaring that originalism “is the idea that the words 
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very recently, Elliot’s Debates was the primary source of 
ratification records, commonly used by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
A third originalist resource worthy of consideration is James 
Madison’s notes on the constitutional convention (Farrand).11 
Although originalists tend to place more importance on the 
ratification of the Constitution than on its drafting, Madison’s 
records of the convention might still have importance in 
ascertaining the original meaning of the text. These were the 
second most used source of original intent at the Supreme Court 
between 1953 and 1984.12 Some suggest that statements in the 
privacy of the convention may be more reliable evidence of 
original meaning than public claims of partisans in the 
ratification debates.13 
Numerous other originalist sources are available to the 
Court, including dictionaries, early court opinions, correspond-
dence among framers, commentaries, actions of the First 
Congress, and other documents, but The Federalist, Elliot’s 
Debates and Farrand are the most prominent originalist re-
sources used by the Court. 
My study on the use of these originalist sources has Justice-
votes for opinions relying on such originalist sources as the unit 
of analysis in the cases in which at least one opinion utilized this 
source. For an example of the operation of the coding system, 
consider Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.14 Justice Souter wrote an opinion 
concurring in part and dissenting in part, which was joined by 
Justice Ginsburg, in which he cited The Federalist.15 Justice Scalia 
wrote a dissenting opinion in which he was joined by Justice 
Stevens, which also cited The Federalist numerous times.16 Justice 
Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion, in which he cited The 
Federalist once.17 The majority opinion, authored by Justice 
O’Connor and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice 
Kennedy, and Justice Breyer, did not cite to The Federalist.18 
 
of the Constitution must be understood as they were understood by the ratifying public 
at the time of enactment”). 
 11. 1–3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand ed., 
1st ed. 1911). 
 12. Corley, Howard & Nixon, supra note 5, at 330. 
 13. See Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the 
Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1189 (2003) (arguing for 
ascribing greater interpretive weight to this resource). 
 14. 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 15. Id. at 545 (Souter, J., concurring).  
 16. Id. at 555, 558, 568, 569, 578 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 17. Id. at 542 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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Under my coding, Justices Souter, Ginsburg, Scalia, Stevens, and 
Thomas receive a “1” in the column for this case, for citing The 
Federalist.19 Justices O’Connor, Rehnquist, Kennedy, and Breyer 
receive a “0” in this column for this case, because some other 
Justice relied on The Federalist in an opinion in the case and they 
did not. 
Counting Justice-votes is preferable to counting decisions. It 
reveals the strength of originalism by the number of Justices an 
opinion commands. Moreover, this approach captures the use 
(or lack of use) of originalism in concurring and dissenting 
opinions. 
There is no way to discern whether a Justice truly relied on 
originalist sources in reaching a decision. Such sources might 
simply “decorate” an opinion, for public consumption, without 
actually playing a role in the Justice’s decision making. But any 
attempt to evaluate the causative influence of the originalist 
source would require mind reading. Many constitutional 
opinions contain no originalist references whatsoever,20 so the 
presence of such a resource reveals some deference to the 
interpretive methodology. 
All Justice-votes are counted equally. One might suggest 
that the opinion author be given particular credit for originalist 
references, as the drafter. The author may not truly control the 
opinion, though, except for a lone dissent or concurrence. 
Research shows that an opinion author may be required to make 
various compromises to retain the coalition behind his or her 
opinion. For majority opinions, political science research sug-
gests that their content is driven by the preferences of the 
necessary fifth voter.21 Efforts to analyze the question 
empirically have found that the opinion author has unique 
influence over the opinion’s content, but that other Justices also 
have influence.22 I presume that each Justice joining an 
originalist opinion is additional evidence of the role of 
originalism. 
 
 18. See id. at 509–39 (majority opinion). 
 19. The coding does not take into account the fact that they cited different 
Federalist Papers, or that an opinion may have relatively more citations to the source. 
 20. See Corley, Howard & Nixon, supra note 5, at 330, 334 (noting that The 
Federalist is by far the most used originalist source by the Court but that it appears as a 
citation in only a small fraction of constitutional opinions). 
 21. See Jeffrey R. Lax & Charles M. Cameron, Bargaining and Opinion Assignment 
on the U.S. Supreme Court, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 276, 279 (2007). 
 22. See Chris W. Bonneau, et al., Agenda Control, the Median Justice, and the 
Majority Opinion on the U.S. Supreme Court, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 890, 902–03 (2007). 
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There are occasional cases in which a Justice references an 
originalist source, such as The Federalist, and then holds that it is 
not helpful to resolve the case before the Court. These are 
included in my analysis. Recognizing and distinguishing an 
originalist source is testimony to its importance to the Justice, 
and an authentic originalist would carefully evaluate the 
applicability of originalist sources in deciding. My evaluation of 
originalism is limited to the Founding era. The approach is also 
relevant to other controversies, such as those involving the 14th 
Amendment. 
The first analysis is for the number of Justice-votes citing 
The Federalist in Supreme Court opinions. Figure 1 displays the 
numbers of Justices joining opinions that cited this source over 
five year period averages throughout history before and during 
the Warren Court. 
FIGURE 1 
USE OF THE FEDERALIST OVER TIME 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Federalist had seen intermittent use through history, until 
the beginning of the Warren Court era, when its use consistently 
and dramatically expanded to heights never before reached at 
the Court. By the end of the Warren Court, use of The Federalist 
was more than twice as high as at any prior time. 
The next analysis adopts the same method for examining 
the use of Elliot’s Debates by the Court. This resource became 
available early in the 19th Century. Figure 2 displays the num-
bers of Justice-votes citing the resource, again with five-year 
averages. 
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FIGURE 2 
USE OF ELLIOT’S DEBATES OVER TIME 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The pattern for citations to Elliot’s Debates is similar to that for 
The Federalist. The source had been intermittently relied upon, 
with peaks and valleys over the history of the Court. With the 
Warren Court era, however, its usage grew dramatically. There 
was another steady increase in use, more than doubling the 
number of Justice-votes citing the ratification debates at any 
time in history. 
As for Farrand’s publication of Madison’s convention notes, 
this resource was unavailable for much of our history. It was first 
published in 1911. The pattern of its usage by Justices of the 
Court is displayed in Figure 3. 
FIGURE 3 
USE OF FARRAND OVER TIME 
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Until the Warren Court era, the Farrand records were seldom 
used. In the Warren Court, however, use of this source exploded. 
All three of the primary originalist resources saw considerably 
expanded use by the Warren Court. 
Overall uses of originalism grew considerably during the 
Warren Court era. Originalist reliance was not uniform among 
the Justices. Table 1 displays the total number of opinions in 
which major Warren Court Justices used one of the three 
sources (The Federalist, Elliot’s Debates, or Farrand). 
TABLE 1 
JUSTICES’ USE OF ORIGINALISM 
Justice Originalist Sources 
Black 28
Brennan 30
Douglas 32
Harlan 38
Stewart 29
Warren 26
White 17
 
The numbers are not directly comparable, because some justices 
served for briefer periods under Chief Justice Warren (Justice 
Marshall, for example, was not appointed until near the end of 
the Warren Court era and had little opportunity to cite 
originalist sources). We can see from these numbers that Justice 
Harlan was probably the greatest originalist but that all the 
Justices used originalism with roughly comparable frequency. 
If one judges originalism by reliance on originalist materials, 
the Warren Court was a time of much expanded originalism, as 
compared to prior constitutional history, and all the Justices 
joined in using originalist sources. Originalism was not “sub-
merged and marginalized”23 as commonly claimed. Rather than a 
departure from a history of originalism, as suggested by Robert 
Bork and others,24 the Warren Court saw the interpretive 
method’s efflorescence. Judged simply by invocation of the 
 
 23. JOHNATHAN O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 39 (2005). 
 24. See, e.g., Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 
47 IND. L.J. 1, 5 & n.10 (1971). See also Berman, supra note 1, at 88; Karlan, supra note 1, 
at 396; Law & McGowan, supra note 1, at 100; Whittington, supra note 1, at 599–601. 
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primary originalist resources, the Warren Court was much more 
originalist than any prior Court. 
II. THE MEANING OF WARREN COURT ORIGINALISM 
The expanded use of originalism in the Warren Court is 
striking, as is the fact that the Justices of the era received no 
credit for originalism. The Justices made much greater use of 
originalist sources in reaching their decisions than in past years. 
Why did they not get credit for doing so? Why were they 
attacked for being non-originalist? 
Those critics who recognized the Warren Court’s use of 
originalism often disregarded it as inauthentic. The Justices of 
the era may have cited to originalist sources, but the critic would 
argue that they did not rely upon them but merely used 
originalism to “decorate” opinions grounded in other rationales. 
While Justice Brennan often used originalist sources, the theory 
that he was truly influenced by the theory was derided as 
“fanciful.”25 
A famous historian’s review of the Supreme Court’s 
reliance on originalism was quite critical.26 While not limited to 
the Warren Court, it focused on the Court’s opinions in cases on 
reapportionment, church and state, and other opinions of the 
era. The author concluded that the Court too often reached 
“conclusions that are plainly erroneous.”27 In one case, Justice 
Black relied on sources that “were so stale and inadequate that a 
properly trained historical scholar would hesitate to suggest that 
an undergraduate student rely on them for anything more than 
‘a once important, although now outdated view.’”28 Perhaps the 
Justices are simply poor at historical analysis, as some have 
suggested.29 Alternatively, the Justices are simply not committed 
 
 25. Robert M. Howard & Jeffrey A. Segal, An Original Look at Originalism, 36 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 113, 118 (2002). 
 26. Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 
119 (1965). 
 27. Id. at 155. 
 28. Id. at 121 (quoting Paul L. Murphy, Time to Reclaim: The Current Challenge of 
American Constitutional History, 69 AM. HIST. REV. 64, 64–65 (1963)). 
 29. E.g., GREGORY BASSHAM, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE CONSTI-
TUTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY 97 (1992) (contending that judges “routinely 
botch history when they set their hands to it”); Buckner F. Melton Jr., Clio at the Bar: A 
Guide to Historical Method for Legists and Jurists, 83 MINN. L. REV. 377, 384 (1998) 
(suggesting that lawyers and judges are “ill-equipped to understand the rudiments of the 
process of historical research”); Richard A. Posner, Past-Dependency, Pragmatism, and 
Critique of History in Adjudication, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 595 (2000) (arguing that 
“[l]egal professionals are not competent to umpire historical disputes”). 
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to getting history right but instead seek to use it as a support for 
decisions reached on different grounds.30 
The Court’s use of originalism may thus be dismissed as a 
rhetorical flourish aimed at providing greater legitimacy to the 
Court’s ruling. Americans have an “almost religious adoration” 
of the Framers.31 Invoking them in support of an opinion may 
enhance that opinion’s appeal. Some suggest that originalism has 
an innate populist appeal.32 Its use “can evoke emotional 
responses that alternatives to originalism cannot directly 
match.”33 
As a result, the Justices may strategically reference 
originalist sources in support of their decisions, even if they did 
not rely on those sources in reaching their decisions. A study of 
the Court’s use of The Federalist found that it was most 
commonly used in controversial outcomes, such as those striking 
down a statute, formally altering precedent, or decided by a 
minimum winning coalition (5-4).34 The authors suggested that 
citing this source was tactical, “to bolster the legitimacy of the 
court when opinions assert judicial power.”35 Another study of 
use of The Federalist reached similar results.36 
The research is by no means conclusive, though, and it is 
certainly possible that a Justice might sincerely rely on originalist 
sources. Perhaps the fundamental appeal of originalism is that 
“if judges don’t follow the original understandings, they will be 
free to do whatever they want.”37 A central concern of 
originalism “is that judges be constrained by the law rather than 
be left free to act according to their own lights, a course that 
originalists regard as essentially lawless.”38 The “best response” 
 
 
 30. See Kelly, supra note 26, at 131 (concluding that historical reliance was merely a 
“rationale for politically inspired activism”). 
 31. CHARLES A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY 181 
(1969). 
 32. See generally Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657 (2009). 
 33. R. George Wright, Originalism and the Problem of Fundamental Fairness, 91 
MARQ. L. REV. 687, 689 (2008). 
 34. Corley, supra note 5, at 334. 
 35. Id. at 336. 
 36. See Robert J. Hume, The Use of Rhetorical Sources by the U.S. Supreme Court, 
40 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 817, 838 (2006). 
 37. David A. Stauss, Why Conservatives Shouldn’t Be Originalists, 31 HARV. J.L. 
PUB. POL’Y 969, 973 (2008). 
 38. Steven D. Smith, Law Without Mind, 88 MICH. L. REV. 104, 106 (1989). 
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to judicial discretion is to “lash judges to the solid mast of 
history.”39 But this may be a futile endeavor. 
The historical originalist record is quite incomplete. The 
ratifiers of the Constitution were largely unaware of the content 
of The Federalist when approving the text and some were 
published only after ratifications.40 The ratification records are 
incomplete and often unreliable,41 and often conflicted on the 
meaning of the ratified text.42 Madison’s notes recorded in 
Farrand were quite an incomplete record of the constitutional 
convention and may have been biased.43 The records that exist 
may be fatally compromised by “the editorial interventions of 
hirelings and partisans.”44 Given the indeterminacy, originalism 
has been described as “questing after a chimera.”45 
In addition, developments over the past two centuries 
obscure the application of originalism. Technological and 
societal developments mean that the originalist record requires 
some translation to be applied to contemporary controversies, 
and such translation requires subjective judgment. The trans-
lation to changed circumstances typically involves the 
identification of the principles underlying the original text. Yet 
the proper level of generality to be ascribed to those principles is 
quite uncertain. When deciding whether protections against 
search and seizure apply to various modern circumstances, 
unknown centuries ago (e.g., thermal imaging), the Justices 
identify the purpose of the constitutional provision to apply it to 
the question. Yet this identification may be quite indeterminate, 
freeing the Justices to adopt whatever conclusion they wish. 
These three features, the somewhat obscure historical 
record, changed circumstances, and uncertain level of generality 
conspire to render originalism indeterminate in its findings. 
Justice Scalia has conceded that in a case there may be “plenty 
of room for disagreement as to what original meaning was, and 
 
 39. Whittington, supra note 1, at 599. 
 40. Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Federalist Papers as a Source of the 
Original Meaning of the U.S. Constitution, 87 B.U. L. REV. 801, 826–29 (2009). 
 41. See James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the 
Documentary Record, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 (1986). 
 42. See Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 
519, 586 (2003) (“If the Constitution means whatever its ratifiers understood it to mean, 
then different conventions arguably ratified different things.”). 
 43. See Hutson, supra note 41, at 25; LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND 
THE FRAMERS’ CONSTITUTION 287 (2000). 
 44. Hutson, supra note 41, at 2. 
 45. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. 
REV. 204, 222 (1980). 
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even more as to how that original meaning applies to the 
situation before the [C]ourt.”46 
As a result, originalism may be manipulated to suit the ends 
of the deciding Justice. This is the originalist critique of the 
Warren Court. The Justices of the Warren Court may have used 
originalist sources, even at a high rate, but they did so selectively 
in pursuit of an ideological agenda. This claim can be checked by 
examining the nature of the decisions supported by originalist 
sources. 
Political scientists commonly categorize the direction of 
Supreme Court opinions as liberal or conservative.47 While this 
coding is imperfect, the resource is commonly used and has 
facial validity in its results (e.g., Scalia and Thomas appear as 
conservatives, Douglas and Marshall as liberals). The effect of 
originalist sources might be seen in a comparison between the 
ideology of Justice-votes in cases involving use of these sources 
and the ideology of such votes in other cases. Table 1 reports this 
comparison for leading members of the Warren Court. 
TABLE 2 
ORIGINALIST SOURCES AND IDEOLOGY IN THE WARREN 
COURT 
Justice Liberal Originalism All Liberal 
Black 64.3% 81.7%
Brennan 76.2% 83.5%
Douglas 78.0% 88.7%
Harlan 35.0% 37.2%
Stewart 37.0% 44.5%
Warren 80.8% 79.2%
White 41.1% 44.4%
 
When liberal Justices used originalism, their votes on the merits 
were consistently liberal. Such votes tended to be slightly more 
conservative than their overall voting record in all cases, so 
originalism may have had some conservative directional tug. But 
during the Warren Court era, Justices who relied on originalism 
produced results roughly in accord with their ideological 
 
 46. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 45 (1997). 
 47. The source commonly used for this categorization is the U.S. Supreme Court 
Database. THE SUPREME COURT DATABASE, http://supremecourtdatabase.org (last 
visited Sept. 23, 2011). 
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preferences. There is at best mild evidence that originalism 
constrained some of the Justices. 
This lends some support to claims that the Justices of the 
period did not sincerely use originalism to decide cases but 
merely employed originalist resources to add legitimacy to 
results reached on other grounds. So there may be some validity 
to the conservative critique of Warren Court originalism. The 
Justices may have simply invoked originalism to legitimize 
decisions reached on other grounds. 
The use of originalism to support predetermined ideological 
outcomes may be more of an indictment of originalism, though, 
than an indictment of the Warren Court Justices. To examine 
this possibility, I considered the voting record of post-Warren 
Court conservative Justices and their use of originalism. Table 3 
displays the liberal votes of various Justices, including the 
modern conservative stalwarts, in cases using originalist sources, 
as compared with all cases. 
TABLE 3 
ORIGINALIST SOURCES AND IDEOLOGY OUTSIDE THE 
WARREN COURT 
 
Justice Liberal Originalism All Liberal 
Scalia 25.0% 24.3%
Thomas 21.7% 17.8%
Rehnquist 21.8% 18.5%
Kennedy 40.0% 35.3%
Stevens 67.5% 63.9%
O’Connor 30.5% 32.9%
Breyer 82.6% 62.8%
 
As with the Justices of the Warren Court, the ideological 
direction of these Justices’ votes using originalism closely 
parallel the ideology of all their votes. The slight differences are 
likely attributable to random variation. The only dramatic 
difference is for Justice Breyer, and this could have been 
attributable to his desire to legitimate liberal constitutional 
decisions. 
We do not know the Justices internal ideological prefer-
ences for particular cases. Perhaps they vote ideologically in 
every case (and Justices Scalia and Thomas happen to prefer the 
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liberal result about twenty percent of the time). Perhaps they are 
constrained sometimes by legal materials, but there is no 
evidence that originalism is any more constraining than any 
alternative legal materials.48 In any case, it is clear that liberal 
Justices who use originalism reach distinctly liberal results, while 
conservative Justices employing originalism reach quite 
conservative results. This need not be evidence of bad faith, it 
may simply be testimony to the psychological power of 
motivated reasoning.49 
CONCLUSION 
The wide perception that the Warren Court rejected 
originalism for a living constitution is unsupported by the data. 
The Warren Court deployed originalist sources more than any 
prior Court in history. It may not have been maximally 
originalist,50 but in context it was certainly a relatively originalist 
Court. 
It is fair to question whether the Warren Court’s originalism 
was truly sincere. The Justices may simply have used originalist 
sources to decorate results grounded in other bases. But this 
effect is not limited to the Warren Court. Subsequent Justices, 
including professed originalists show a similar pattern of 
 
 48. This is consistent with a study of federalism opinions. See Smith, supra note 3, at 
284. A study of votes on the Seventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion. See Sara C. 
Benesh & Jason J. Czarnezki, The Ideology of Legal Interpretation, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 113, 114–15 (2009) (“[A]rguments suggesting that legal interpretation is deter-
minative and hence alleviates room for attitudinally-motivated outcomes are 
overstated.”). In addition, a nonempirical examination of cases citing The Federalist 
suggested that the citations were primarily for the sake of appearances and that it was 
“hard to come up with more than a small handful of cases where The Federalist even 
arguably played a decisive role in the Court’s decision.” Melvyn R. Durchslag, The 
Supreme Court and the Federalist Papers: Is There Less Here than Meets the Eye?, 14 WM. 
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 243, 313 (2005). 
 49. Motivated reasoning is simply the tendency for people’s perceptions of facts to 
be influenced by their underlying values or ideology. Eileen Braman & Thomas E. 
Nelson, Mechanism of Motivated Reasoning?: Analogical Perception in Discrimination 
Disputes, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 940, 941 (2007). The concept is well-established in 
psychology and has been applied to legal decisions. See generally id. 
 50. In many constitutional cases, the Justices use no originalist sources. Jeffrey M. 
Shaman, The End of Originalism, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 83, 87 (2010) (“[T]he vast 
majority of Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Constitution have been 
nonoriginalist in their methodology.”). However, a comparison of the data for the 
Warren Court and subsequent Courts, such as the Rehnquist Court, considered more 
originalist, shows that later Courts have made significantly more use of The Federalist but 
not Farrand or Elliot’s Debates. The Warren Court was not strikingly less originalist than 
the Rehnquist Court. 
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convenient ideological outcomes. Any problem of insincerity 
seems associated with originalism itself, not the Justices of the 
Warren Court. 
These findings do not wholly dispel the potential influence 
of originalism at the Court. I study only outcomes, and it is 
possible that originalism had a material influence on the content 
of the Court’s opinions and decision rules that they laid down.51 
There is no apparent way to measure this, however, and one 
would expect that a powerful originalist decision would affect 
outcomes—conservative critics of the Warren Court certainly so 
profess. 
The decision in District of Columbia v. Heller52 is considered 
by some to represent an apotheosis of originalism at the Court. 
Yet it aptly illustrates the findings of this Article. All of the 
Justices relied heavily on originalism, yet the outcome split on 
predictable ideological valences. Consequently, it seems fair to 
question whether it was truly originalism that drove the Justices’ 
opinions, as opposed to their policy preferences. Heller is not 
unique in this regard.53 
Moreover, while the opinions were flush with originalist 
sources, a key portion of the majority opinion totally ignored 
originalism. Justice Scalia cited instances where the government 
could regulate arms notwithstanding the Second Amendment 
but offered zero originalist basis for these exceptions. Nelson 
Lund has argued that this aspect of the opinion departed so far 
from originalism that the opinion should be considered poor.54 
The opinions in Heller look suspiciously like policy driven 
opinions, decorated with originalist support. 
Some time ago, Justice Scalia suggested, “It would be hard 
to count . . . on the hairs of one’s youthful head, the opinions 
that have in fact been rendered not on the basis of what the 
Constitution originally meant, but on the basis of what the 
 
 51. See Douglas H. Ginsburg, Originalism and Economic Analysis: Two Case 
Studies of Consistency and Coherence in Supreme Court Decision Making, 33 HARV. J.L. 
PUB. POL’Y 217, 237 (2010) (contending that originalism restricts the possible bases for 
decisions). 
 52. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 53. See Richard Primus, The Functions of Ethical Originalism, 88 TEX. L. REV. SEE 
ALSO 79, 79 (2010) (observing that the Justices “frequently divide on questions of 
original meaning, and the divisions have a way of mapping what we might suspect are the 
justices’ leanings about the merits of the cases irrespective of originalist considerations”). 
 54. See Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist 
Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1345 (2009). 
!!!CROSS-281-ORIGINALISMTHEFORGOTTENYEARS.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 5/31/2012  12:08 PM 
2012] ORIGINALISM—THE FORGOTTEN YEARS 51 
 
judges currently thought it desirable for it to mean.”55 While he 
would resort to originalism to combat this effect, originalism 
appears to offer no restraining influence. Justices may simply 
cloak their ideological biases with materials from the ratification 
era that are available. It is difficult to find a professed originalist, 
in the judiciary or in the academy, who believes that the original 
meaning of the Constitution is significantly different from his or 
her personal policy preferences. 
 
 
 55. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 852 
(1989). 
